

Pierpaolo Battigalli: Publications

October 2023

Books

- *Restrizioni razionali su sistemi di probabilità soggettive e soluzioni di giochi ad informazione completa*. Milano: EGEA, 1993.
- *Teoria dei Giochi*, Treccani, 2021 (previously published in 2004 as entry “Teoria dei Giochi” in *Enciclopedia del Novecento*, III supplemento).

Edited Books

- *Decisions, Games and Markets*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997 (with A. Montesano and F. Panunzi).

Articles and Notes in Refereed Journals

- “Belief Change, Rationality, and Strategic Reasoning in Sequential Games” (with E. Catonini and J. Manili), *Games and Economic Behavior* (2023), **142**, 527-551.
- “Learning and Selfconfirming Equilibria in Network Games” (with F. Panebianco, and P. Pin), *Journal of Economic Theory* (2023), **212**, 105700.
- “Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory” (with M. Dufwenberg), *Journal of Economic Literature* (2022), **60**, 833-882.
- “A Framework for the Analysis of Self-Confirming Policies” (with S. Cerreia Vioglio, F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, and T. Sargent), *Theory and Decisions* (2022), **92**, 455–512.
- “Beliefs, Plans, and Perceived Intentions in Dynamic Games” (with N. De Vito), *Journal of Economic Theory* (2021), **195**, 105283.
- “Frustration and Anger in the Ultimatum Game: An Experiment” (with C. Aina, and A. Gamba), *Games and Economic Behavior* (2020), **122**, 150-167.
- “Behavioral Equivalence of Extensive Game Structures” (with P. Leonetti and F. Maccheroni), *Games and Economic Behavior* (2020), **121**, 533-547.
- “Epistemic Game Theory Without Type Structures. An Application to Psychological Games” (with R. Corrao, and F. Sanna), *Games and Economic Behavior* (2020), **120**, 28-57.
- “Incorporating Belief-Dependent Motivation in Games” (with R. Corrao, and M. Dufwenberg), *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* (2019), **167**, 185-218.
- “Belief-Dependent Preferences and Reputation: Experimental Analysis of a Repeated Trust Game” (with G. Attanasi, E. Manzoni, and R. Nagel), *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* (2019), **167**, 341-360.
- “Interactive Epistemology in Simple Dynamic Games with a Continuum of Strategies” (with P. Tebaldi), *Economic Theory* (2019), **68**, 737-763.
- “Learning and Self-Confirming Long-Run Biases” (with A. Francetich, G. Lanzani, and M. Marinacci), *Journal of Economic Theory* (2019), **183**, 740-785.
- “Frustration, Aggression, and Anger in Leader-Follower Games” (with M. Dufwenberg and A. Smith), *Games and Economic Behavior* (2019), **117**, 15-39.

- “Ambiguity Attitudes and Self-Confirming Equilibrium in Sequential Games” (with G. Lanzani, E. Catonini, and M. Marinacci), *Games and Economic Behavior* (2019), **115**, 1-29.
- “Cooperation Across Disciplines: A Multilevel Perspective on Cooperative Behavior in Governing Interfirm Relations” (with C. Salvato and J. Reuer), *Academy of Management Annals* (2017), **11**, 1-45.
- “Mixed Extensions of Decision Problems under Uncertainty” (with S. Cerreia Vioglio, F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci), *Economic Theory* (2017), **63**, 827-866.
- “Analysis of Information Feedback and Selfconfirming Equilibrium” (with S. Cerreia Vioglio, F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci), *Journal of Mathematical Economics* (2016), **66**, 40–51.
- “A Note on Comparative Ambiguity Aversion and Justifiability” (with S. Cerreia Vioglio, F. Maccheroni, and M. Marinacci), *Econometrica* (2016), **84**, 1903-1916.
- “Incomplete Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game” (with G. Attanasi and E. Manzoni), *Management Science* (2016), **62**, 648-667.
- “Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty” (with S. Cerreia Vioglio, F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci), *American Economic Review* (2015), **105**, 646–677.
- “Deception: The Role of Guilt” (with G. Charness and M. Dufwenberg), *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* (2013), **93**, 227-232.
- “Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information” (with A. Prestipino), *The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics* (2013), **13**: Iss. 1 (Contributions), 1-53.
- “Forward Induction Reasoning Revisited” (with A. Friedenberg), *Theoretical Economics* (2012), **7**, 57-98.
- “Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information” (with A. Di Tillio, E. Grillo and A. Penta), *The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics* (2011), **11** : Iss. 1 (Advances), Article 6.
- “Dynamic Psychological Games” (with M. Dufwenberg), *Journal of Economic Theory* (2009), **144**, 1-35. [lead article, included in the *50th Anniversary special issue* of the JET.]
- “Costly Contracting in a Long-Term Relationship” (with G. Maggi), *RAND Journal of Economics* (2008), **39**, 352-377.
- “Interactive Epistemology in Games with Payoff Uncertainty” (with M. Siniscalchi), *Research in Economics* (2007), **61**, 165-184.
- “Guilt in Games” (with M. Dufwenberg), *American Economic Review (P&P)*, **97** (2007), 170-176.
- “Buyer Power and Quality Improvement” (with C. Fumagalli and M. Polo), *Research in Economics* (2007), **61**, 45-61.
- “Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications,” *International Game Theory Review*, **8** (2006), 1-27.
- “Rationalizable Bidding in First Price Auctions” (with M. Siniscalchi), *Games and Economic Behavior*, **45** (2003), 38-72.

- “Rationalization and Incomplete Information” (with M. Siniscalchi), *Advances in Theoretical Economics*, **3** (2003) (1), Article 3.
- “Rationalizability in Infinite, Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information,” *Research in Economics*, **57** (2003), 1-38.
- “Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning” (with M. Siniscalchi), *Journal of Economic Theory*, **106** (2002), 356-391.
- “Rigidity, Discretion and the Cost of Writing Contracts” (with G. Maggi), *American Economic Review*, **92** (2002), 798-817.
- “A Note on Rationalizability and Reputation with Two Long-Run Players,” *RISEC (International Review of Economics and Business)*, **48** (2001), 383-393.
- “Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games” (with M. Siniscalchi), *Journal of Economic Theory*, **88** (1999), 188-230.
- “Interactive Beliefs, Epistemic Independence and Strong Rationalizability” (with M. Siniscalchi), *Research in Economics*, **53** (1999), 247-273.
- “Recent Results on Belief, Knowledge and the Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory” (with G. Bonanno), *Research in Economics*, **53** (1999), 149-225.
- “Synchronic Information and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games” (with G. Bonanno), *Research in Economics*, **53** (1999), 77-99.
- “Dynamic Consistency and Imperfect Recall,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, **20** (1997), 31-50.
- “On Rationalizability in Extensive Games,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **74** (1997), 40-61.
- “On ‘Reputation’ Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs” (with J. Watson), *Econometrica*, **65** (1997), 369-374.
- “The Logic of Belief Persistence” (with G. Bonanno), *Economics and Philosophy*, **13** (1997), 39-59.
- “Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **70** (1996), 201-234.
- “A Note on Stochastic Independence without Savage-Null Events” (with P. Veronesi), *Journal of Economic Theory*, **70** (1996), 235-248.
- “Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, **13** (1996), 178-200.
- “Structural Consistency and Strategic Independence in Extensive Games,” *Ricerche Economiche*, **48** (1994), 357-376.
- “A Comment on Strategic Rationality Orderings and Computation Trembles,” *Economic Notes*, **23** (1994), 19-25.
- “Learning and Convergence to Equilibrium in Repeated Strategic Interaction” (with M. Gilli and C. Molinari), *Ricerche Economiche*, **46** (1992), 335-378.
- “Implementable Strategies, Prior Information and the Problem of Credibility in Extensive Games,” *RISEC (International Review of Economics and Business)*, **35** (1988), 705-733.

- “Il concetto di equilibrio nei modelli strategici e parametrici,” *Il Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia*, **47** (1988), 99-118.

Reviews in Refereed Journals

- “Four Textbooks on Game Theory” (with M. Li Calzi), *Ricerche Economiche*, **47** (1993), 93-103.

Articles and Notes in Books

- “Strategies and Interactive Beliefs in Dynamic Games” (with A. Di Tillio and D. Samet), in D. Acemoglu, M. Arellano, E. Dekel (eds.) *Advances in Economics and Econometrics*, Tenth World Congress, Vol. 1 Economic Theory (Econometric Society Monographs No. 49), Cambridge: CUP, 2013, 391-422.
- “Giochi, teoria dei” in *Dal XX al XXI secolo: problemi e prospettive (Enciclopedia del Novecento*, Supplemento III, Volume A-G, 2004).
- “Games with Observable Deviators,” in P. Battigalli, A. Montesano and F. Panunzi (eds.) *Decisions, Games and Markets*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, 57-96.
- “Conjectural Equilibria and Rationalizability in a Game with Incomplete Information” (with D. Guaitoli), in P. Battigalli, A. Montesano and F. Panunzi (eds.) *Decisions, Games and Markets*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, pp. 97-124.
- “Synchronic Information and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games” (with G. Bonanno), in M. Bacharach, L.A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin, and H. Shin (eds.) *Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997, pp. 235-263.
[Also published in *Research in Economics* (1999), see above.]
- Comment to “On the Decision Theoretic Foundation of Game Theory” by M. Mariotti, in K.J. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman, and C. Schmidt (eds) *The Foundations of Rational Economic Behavior*, London: McMillan, 1996.
- “Giochi ad informazione incompleta con aspettative soggettive mutuamente incoerenti,” in A. Montesano (ed.) *Teoria economica dell’organizzazione*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996, pp. 211-233.
- “Algorithmic Solutions for Extensive Games,” in G. Ricci (ed.) *Decision Processes in Economics*, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1991.